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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is suit brought by the widow and five children of 
Gordon Switzer, pursuant to Section 78-11-7, Utah Code Annota-
ted (1953, as amended), for the wrongful death of Gordon 
Switzer. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Appellants' statement as to the disposition in the 
lower court is correct. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent seeks to have the judgment entered by the 
lower court against the Appellants sustained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent agrees with the Appellants' Statement of 
Facts, with the exception of the Appellants' statement that 
Jack Thompson saw the incident clearly and concluded that 
Gordon Switzer appeared to have no problem with the machine. 
In addition to the facts set forth in the Appellants' 
Statement of Facts, the Court should be aware of the following 
dates: 
1. Birth dates of the Switzer children: 
A. Connie Lou Switzer 
B. Raymond Gordon Switzer 
c. Donald Eugene Switzer 
D. Rodney Dean Switzer 
E. Therease Jo Switzer 
October 25, 1956 
October 25, 1957 
January 26, 1959 
October 29, 1960 
May 22, 1963 
2. Date of sale of the 175A front end loader by Clark: 
August 25, 1956. 
-i-
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3. Date of the accident resulting in the death of Gordon 
Switzer: June 24, 1963. 
4. Date on which Appellants filed the Complaint in this 
action: October 23, 1974. 
-ii-
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POINT I 
THE BURDEN WAS ON THE APPELLANTS, IN OPPOSITION TO THE 
RESPONDENT REYNOLDS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, TO 
SET FORTH SPECIFIC FACTS ESTABLISHING A GENUINE ISSUE OF 
MATERIAL FACT AND FAILURE SO TO DO MADE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PROPER. 
A. The Appellants were required by Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure to establish a genuine issue of material fact. 
The procedure to be followed by a party adverse to a 
Motion for Summary Judgment clearly is set forth in Rule 
56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That subdivision 
provides in its entirety: 
Supporting and opposing affidavit shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported, as provided in this Rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him. 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (emphasis added). 
It has been the Respondents' contention throughout the 
proceedings in the lower court that the Appellants have no 
facts which support their allegations of negligence on the 
part of the Respondents. The Appellants have an abundence of 
-1-
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conclusions, but a dearth of facts supporting those conslu-
sions. It was due to this scarcity of supporting facts that 
the Appellants were unable to meet the requirement of Subdivi-
sion (e) of Rule 56. That subdivision requires that a party 
opposing a motion for summary judgment establish specific 
facts showing a genuine issue for trial. The Appellants were 
required to establish those specific facts by affidavits, made 
upon personal knowledge, setting forth facts admissible in 
evidence. 
As the record discloses, the Respondent Reynolds' Motion 
for Summary Judgment was supported by the Affidavits of Bryce 
Reynolds and Richard Reynolds. Those Affidavits were made 
upon personal knowledge and contain evidence admissible at 
trial. That evidence established that the 175A tractor was 
not defective and that the Respondent Reynolds was not 
negligent. The Appellants did not submit any affidavit 
whatsoever to contradict those submitted by the Respondent 
Reynolds nor did the Appellants, in their Memorandum in 
Opposition to Reynolds' Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
September 4, 1977, Memorandum referred to therein, cite any 
"depositions, answers to interrrogatories, or further affi-
davits," as provided by Subdivision (e). The Appellants' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent Reynolds' Motion for 
Summary Judgment contains nothing other than the Appellants' 
conclusions regarding the negligence of Reynolds and defects 
-2-
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in the 175A tractor. The Appellants completely failed to meet 
the burden placed upon them by Subdivision (e) of Rule 56. 
Now, on appeal, they wish, again, to ignore facts and argue 
conclusions. In no portion of Rule 56, the rule governing 
summary judgment actions, does it provide that a party oppos-
ing a motion for summary judgment may rely upon his conclusion 
as to the issues at hand. The purpose of the motion is to 
force a party to document facts which support his conclusion 
and his cause of action. When placed to this task, if a party 
connot document the supporting facts, then there is no need to 
take the matter to trial. When the Appellants were placed to 
this task, they responded with self-serving conclusions. 
These conclusions, like any theory, are worthless without 
supporting foundation. 
The lower court, when reviewing the memoranda and 
supporting documents placed before it by the Respondent 
Reynolds, and those filed by the Appellants, made the same 
determination. The Respondent Reynolds could document that 
it was not negligent and that the 175A tractor was not 
defective. His documentation met the criteria of Subdivision 
(e) of Rule 56. The Appellants responded with no facts which 
contradicted the testimony supplied in the Respondent Reynolds' 
affidavits, thus leaving the court with no alternative but to 
grant summary judgment in the Respondent Reynolds' favor. The 
court was bound by the provisions of Subdivision (e) which 
-3-
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required that "If he [the opposing party] does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him." Rule 56, Subdivision (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In addition to the direction given by Subdivision (e), 
the court was compelled, in an equitable manner, to enter 
summary judgment against the Appellants., The Respondents 
were being required to defend an action filed eleven years 
after the cause of action accrued. After commencing this 
action, the Appellants undertook extensive discovery of both 
Respondents, and, in the case of Clark, submitted, in the 
form of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Docu-
ments, 1,845 questions and 497 requests for production of 
documents. In response to this discovery Clark provided 
the Appellants with all the documents it had concerning the 
design and manufacture of the 175A tractor and attempted, to 
the best of its ability, to answer the 1,845 questions direct~ 
to it. It was not until this discovery was completed that the 
Respondents brought the motions now being reviewed by this 
Court. The Appellants had ample time within which to document 
specific facts upon which they would rely in establishing 
their causes of action. If such facts had existed, the 
Appellants would have found them. Instead, when the Respon-
dents brought their Motions, the Appellants were unable to 
document these facts, as required by Subdivision (e) of Rule 
56 and thereby failed in their opposition to the Motions. 
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CONCLUSION 
The provisions of Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
aure, are clear. The Appellants did not meet their burden of 
establishing, upon personal knowledge and in a form admissible 
at trial, the facts which would indicate a genuine issue of 
material fact existing in this matter. The lower court 
properly ruled that Reynolds is entitled to summary judgment 
on the issues of its alleged negligence and the alleged 
defective condition of the 175A tractor. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANTS ARE BARRED FROM ASSERTING 
THE RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO PLEAD THE 
SPECIFIC SECTION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMI-
TATIONS BY THE APPELLANTS' FAILURE TO RAISE 
THIS ISSUE IN THE LOWER COURT 
A. The Appellants' Failure to Raise in the Trial Court 
the Issue of Improper Pleading Prohibits Them from Raising It 
on Appeal. The Appellants take this appeal from the lower 
court's Order granting Reynolds' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Clark's Motion for Dismissal. Both Respondents, in 
support of their respective Motions, filed supporting memo-
randa, in which they argued the effect of Section 78-12-28(2}, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended}. The Appellants, in 
opposition to these two Motions, filed two memoranda, in which 
they argued that the statute of limitations was not a bar. In 
neither of the two memoranda filed by the Appellants was the 
Respondents' failure to plead the specific statute ever 
-5-
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raised. Nor was this issue raised through any other pleading 
or motion placed before the lower court. The first time that 
the Respondents were confronted with Rule 9(h) was upon 
receipt of the Appellants' Brief. 
The Appellants failure to raise, before the lower court, 
the issue of the Respondents' defective pleadings constitutes 
a waiver of that defense. Utah cases are clear on this point. 
In the case of Attorney General of Utah v. Pomerow, 93 Utah 426, 
73 P.2d 1277, 1300 (1937) the Utah Supreme Court, when review-
ing the Respondent's failure to plead, by section and subdivi-
sion number, the specific statute of limitation upon which he 
was relying, held that: 
The Appellant's next contention is that 
the statutes were not pleaded as required 
by law because the specific subsection of 
Section 104-2-26 was not set out, as 
required by Section 104-13-7. This 
question was raised for the first time in 
this Court. The motion to strike the 
amendment or to reply to the amendment did 
not mention it. We shall not, therefore, 
now consider it, except to say that the 
only part of Section 104-2-26 which could 
apply to the allegations of the Complaint 
is Subsection (1). No one could have been 
mislead as to what part of Section 104-2-26 
the Respondents' relied upon. 
Attorney General of Utah v. Pomerow, 73 P.2d at 1300. 
The Appellants did not raise the defense of failure 
to correctly plead the statute of limitations until reaching 
this Court, nor were they mislead by the Respondents' failure 
to plead the specific section. The Appellants, in their 
-6-
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Brief, acknowledge that: "If any statute of limitation 
applies, it would be Section 78-12-28, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended)." Appellants' Brief at 9. With this 
admission, the Appellants have disspelled any doubt that may 
have lingered concerning whether or not they were mislead or 
prejudiced by the Respondents' failure to plead the specific 
section and subdivision. See also Dean Vincent, Inc. v. 
Chamberlain , 264 Or. 187, 504 P.2d 722, 724 (1972). 
a. Application of the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel or 
Estoppel in Pais. 
The Appellants, in their argument for the application of 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel, attempt to create a novel 
extension of that doctrine. With the veil removed, the 
Appellants' theory is that if an opponent in a lawsuit fails 
to prove any defense he may have as quickly as possible, he 
may be estopped to prove that defense at any later time. In 
support of this theory, the Appellants cite three Utah cases 
which apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel in its more 
traditional role. In each one of three cases cited: Whitaker 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 522 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Utah 1974); Rice 
v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159, 
162-63 (1969); and Weir v. Bauer, 75 Utah 498, 286 P. 936, 946 
(1930), the party sought to be estopped made representations 
upon which the Appellant relied in delaying the institution of 
suit upon his cause of action. In both Whitaker and Rice, 
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governmental officials represented to the Appellants that a 
settlement would be effected in the near future. Those 
Appellants, in reliance upon the representations of the 
officials, delayed giving the notices required under the 
Governmental Immunity Act and failed to file their Complaints 
within the statute of limitations provided by that act. This 
Court held that, as a result of representations made to the 
Appellants by the officials, the officials would be estopped 
from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. 
In Weir, a stockholder relied upon representations made 
by a corporation regarding payment by the corporation to the 
stockholder on debts owed to the stockholder. As a result of 
these representations, the stockholder did not initiate action 
on the overdue debts and the statute of limitations ran. Wh~ 
the stockholder commenced suit, the corporation raised the 
statute of limitations as a defense and this Court held, in 
that situation, that the corporation be estopped to assert 
that defense. 
In the present matter, the Appellants can point to no 
representations made by either Respondents concerning whether 
or not the Respondents would assert the statute of limita-
tions, nor did the Respondents act to delay the filing of 
Appellants' Complaint. The cases cited by the Appellants do 
not support their argument. 
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The Appellants' argument for equitable estoppel must 
fail. This Court continuously has held that an essential 
element of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is that of 
misrepresentation or concealment. See Rabarino v. Price, 123 
Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953). The Appellants cannot 
point to any representations made by the Respondents to the 
effect that they would not act upon their affirmative defense 
of the statute of limitations. Such an inability on the part 
of the Appellants is fatal to their argument. 
c. Conclusion. 
The Appellants have waived, by their failure to raise the 
issue in the lower court, their right to use the Respon-
dents' defective pleadings. The argument for the application 
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, though novel, over-
looks an essential element of that doctrine and, there-
fore, must fail. 
POINT III 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROVIDED IN 
SECTION 78-12-28(2), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(1953, AS AMENDED) WILL RUN SO LONG AS A 
MEMBER OF THE CLASS ENTITLED TO SUE IS 
UNDER NO DISABILITY AND FAILS TO SUE 
WITHIN A TWO-YEAR PERIOD. 
The Respondent Clark's argument on this point, simply stated 
is: whenever a class of persons is entitled to sue on one 
cause of action and any one person in that class has the 
statute of limitations run against him, then the cause of 
-9-
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action is lost for the entire class. This position is sup-
ported by the case of Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Sanders, 5 s.w. 
562 (Ky. 1887). In the Sanders case, the minors of a decedent 
were estopped from bringing suit for wrongful death due to the 
fact that the statute of limitations had run against a member 
of the class entitled to sue. As in Utah, the Kentucky 
wrongful death statute provided for one cause of action only. 
That cause of action accrued to anyone of three persons: the 
widow, heirs of the decedent, or the personal representative 
of the decedent's estate. The Sanders court observed that: 
If there be one of these in being, with 
the right to sue, then does not the policy 
of the law and the comparison and consider-
ation of all the statutory provisions upon 
the subject dictate that the action must 
be brought within the year from the 
accrual of such right, to avoid a bar as 
to all? 
Sanders, supra, at 564. 
Since neither the Utah wrongful death statute nor the 
statute of limitations applicable to that statute speak to 
this issue, the Court must look elsewhere for guidance. The 
Appellants cite numerous cases, including the recent decision 
of this Court in Scott v. School Board of Granite School 
District, 560 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977). However, in each case 
cited by the Appellants, an important element is missing. Not 
one of those cases contain the situation where one cause of 
action existed for a class of people and the statute of 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
limitations had run against a member of that class. In each 
case, only one person was entitled to sue on the cause of 
action. In the present matter, we have a class composed of 
the widow of the deceased and five children. There can be no 
doubt that the statute of limitations ran as against the 
widow, Louella R. Switzer Bowles, since she was under no 
disability for the two years immediately subsequent to 
the accrual of the cause of action. That she was entitled to 
bring the action as the survivor of the deceased is set forth 
in Section 78-11-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), 
which provides, in pertinent part: 
When the death of a person not a minor is 
caused by the wrongful action or neglect 
of another, his heirs, or his personal 
representatives for the benefit of his 
heirs, may maintain an action for damages 
against the person causing the death • • • 
Persuasive authority which would bring about the policy 
set forth in the Sanders case, if controlling in this case, 
is found in the Utah Products Liability Act, Section 78-15-3, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) which provides, in its 
entirety: 
(1) No action shall be brought for the recovery 
of damages for personal injury, death or damage 
to property more than six years after the date 
of initial purchase for use or consumption or 
ten years after the date of manufacture, of a 
product, where the action is based upon, or 
arises out of any of the following: 
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(a) Breach of implied warranty; 
(b) Defects in design, inspection, 
testing or manufacture; 
(c) Failure to warn; 
(d) Failure to properly instruct in 
the use of a product; or 
(e) Any other alleged defect or 
failure of whatsoever kind or nature 
in relation to a product. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply 
to all eersons, regardless of minority or other 
legal disability, but shall not apply to any 
cause of action where the personal injury, 
death or damage to property occurs within two 
years after the effective date of this Act. 
The purpose of this provision of the Utah Products Liability 
Act is to prevent suit such as the one presently before this 
Court. The Legislature has made a policy decision that it is 
unfair to require manufacturers to defend products liability 
actions filed a substantial number of years after the date the 
product was either manufactured or sold. This unfairness is 
evident in the present lawsuit in that both Respondents are 
required to defend allegations of negligence, breach of 
warranty, and strict liability arising out of an accident that 
occurred 15 years ago and relating to a machine manufactured 
22 years ago. This unfairness is emphasized by the fact that 
Louella R. Switzer Bowles could have filed this action at a~ 
time after June 24, 1963. Instead, she waited 11 years to 
bring this action. If this Court applies the interpretation 
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propounded by the Appellants to the Wrongful Death Act and 
statute of limitations, the statute of limitations would not 
run on this action until May 23, 1983, which date would be two 
years and one day after the youngest of the Appellants, 
Therease Jo Switzer, born May 22, 1963, obtained her majority. 
This would be one month and two days short of being twenty 
years from the date of the accident and twenty-seven years and 
three months from the date of sale of the 175A tractor by 
Clark. To require a manufacturer, or any party, to defend an 
action at the expiration of such a substantial period of time 
is more than unfair: it approaches a violation of the due 
process and equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This Court should consider the conclusion reached by 
the court in Sanders: 
When the administrator qualified, there was a 
person in esse who had the right to sue for 
and recover and receive entire damages, 
leaving no longer in existence a cause of 
action. The statute then began to run, not 
only against him, but against the cause of 
action. The statutory saving on behalf of 
the infant is only intended to apply when 
there is no one in being who has the power to 
sue. Unless this construction be given to 
it, the Statute of Limitations is not one of 
repose, as the cause of action may be kept 
alive for over twenty years, although there 
is one in being during the entire time who 
has the right to sue. 
Sanders, supra, at 565 (emphasis added). 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent submits that when considering the interest 
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of all parties and the policy adopted by the Utah Legislature 
in the Utah Products Liability Act, this Court should hold 
that the statute of limitations ran against the Appellants' 
cause of action when Louella R. Switze Bowles failed to 
institute suit on the wrongful death action prior to June 24, 
1965. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT IS VESTED WITH THE DISCRETIONARY 
POWER TO PLACE, AS A CONDITION OF THE TAKING OF A 
DEPOSITION, THAT THE PARTY NOTICING THE DEPOSITION 
PAY THE OPPOSING PARTY'S COSTS OF ATTENDING THE 
DEPOSITION. 
A. Conditions Placed upon Discovery. Under the Amended 
Protective Order dated June 29, 1977, the trial court ordered, 
inter alia, that the Appellants, as a condition placed upon 
the taking of the depositions of Walter L. Black and M. L. 
Conrad, pay to Clark, the costs incurred by its counsel in 
attending the depositions in Benton Harbor, Michigan. These 
costs would include attorney's fees at the rate of $70.00 per 
hour. The Order further provided that all costs incurred in 
the inspection of the Respondent's microfilm records at Benton 
Barbor were to be borne by the Appellants. 
Rule 26(c), Otah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides the 
trial court with the authority to make an order limiting 
discovery, such as the Order outlined above. That rule 
provides, in pertinent part, that: 
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Upon motion by a party or by the person 
from whom discovery is sought, and for 
good cause shown, the Court in which the 
action is pending ••• may make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party 
or persons from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense, 
including one or more of the following: 
(2) that the discovery may be had only on 
specified terms and conditions, including 
a designation of the time or place ••• 
Rule 26(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
It is well recognized in jurisdictions following the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from which Rule 26(c) was 
adopted, that the trial court, in making a protective order 
under Rule 26(c), is vested with wide discretion. See Banta 
v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 544, 544 P.2d 653, 654 (1976); 
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. City of Wichita, 217 Kan. 44, 536 
P.2d 54, 64 (1975). The Appellants argue that the trial court 
abused this discretion since, in their opinion, the order 
effectively denied them discovery of microfilm records main-
tained by the Respondent Clark in Benton Harbor. See Appellants' 
~ at 22. Due to the fact that the Appellants are unwill-
ing to pay the costs which would be incurred in retrieving and 
reviewing the microfilm records, .it would apear that the Order 
does prevent discovery of those records. However, the deci-
sion of whether or not to pay for the retrieval and review is 
that of the Appellants. 
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The Appellants cannot argue, successfully, that a trial 
judge cannot order a party seeking an out of state deposition 
to pay the travel costs and attorney's fees incurred by the 
opposing party. See Gibson v. Inter'l Freighting Corp., 173 
F.2d 591 (3rd Cir.) cert. den. 338 U.S. 832 reh. den. 338 u.s. 
882 (1949); North Atlantic & Gulf S.S. Co. v. United States, 
209 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1954). In the Gibson case, the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, held that a 
party wishing to take an out of state deposition of a witness 
for use at trial would be required to pay the costs incurred 
by the opposing party in attending that deposition. Those 
costs would include the attorney's fees incurred by the 
opposing party. See Gibson, supra; see also Annot. 70 A.L.R. 
2d 685, 758-64 (1960); see generally Moore v. George A. Hor~l 
~' 4 F.R.D. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); 4 Moore's Federal Practice, 
Paragraph 26.77 (1976). 
In the present matter, the trial court was confronted 
with a situation wherein the Appellants wished to depose 
two expert witnesses employed by the Respondant Clark and 
residing in Benton Harbor, Michigan. These depositions were 
entirely for the benefit of the Appellants and not sought by 
the Respondant Clark. In this respect, the present case is 
identical to the Gibson case, cited above. In addition to the 
fact that the depositions were solely beneficial to the 
Appellants, the court was advised of the fact that the Appell· 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ants had submitted Interrogatories and Request for Production 
upon the Respondant Clark, totaling 1845 individual questions 
with an additional 497 requested documents. In response to 
these Interrogatories and Requests for Production, the Respon-
dant Clark supplied, to the best of its ability, all of the 
information requested. 
In spite of the vast discovery previously completed by 
them, the Appellants sought to discover microfilm records 
which, in their own words, would take: "A considerable period 
of time, perhaps a week or more • " Appellants' Brief at 
22. The Respondent Clark was not required, as the Appellants 
suggested, to undertake the retrieval and review of the 
microfilm records at its own expense. See Celanese Corp. V. E. 
I. duPont deNemours & Co., 16 F.R. Serv. 2d 1531 {D. Del. 
1973) {parties seeking broad discovery of documents were 
ordered to bear costs of producing them.) 
When viewed in light of the past discovery undertaken by 
the Appellants and the burden and expense that would have been 
placed upon the Respondent Clark if Clark were required to 
pay the cost of its counsel attending the depositions and 
reviewing the microfilm records and, further, the costs of 
retrieving the microfilm records, the court properly decided 
that if such discovery was to be undertaken by the Appellants, 
that justice required that the Appellants pay for such dis-
covery. 
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B. Appellants' Requests for Costs and Attorney's Fees on 
Motion to Compel Discovery. 
The Appellants' final argument under this point is that 
this Court should award them the attorney's fees and costs 
they incurred in various motions wherein they undertook to 
compel the Respondent Clark to respond to certain discovery. 
The Appellants freely admit in their Brief that they request~ 
that these costs be awarded and, as of this time, the trial 
court has yet to rule on these requests. See Appellants' 
Brief at 23. A primary rule of appellate practice is that the 
appellate court will not review a matter pending before a 
lower court until the lower court has entered a final order or 
judgment. See Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
lower court has not decided the Appellants' request for costs 
and attorney's fees, made concurrent with their Motion to 
Compel and, therefore, this question is not properly before 
this Court. 
C. Conclusion •• 
The trial court acted properly and within the bounds of 
its discretion when ordering the Appellants to pay the costs 
to be incurred by the Respondent Clark in having its counsel 
attend out of state depositions and, further, the costs to be 
incurred in retrieving and reviewing the micro-film records. 
CONCLUSION TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
The Appellants challenge the lower courts decision on two 
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grounds. The first being that summary judgment was not 
proper due to the fact that a genuine issue of fact existed 
under their theories of negligence and for breach of warranty. 
The Appellants failed to properly set forth any facts which 
would have supported those theories. The only facts before 
the lower court indicated no negligence nor a breach of 
warranty. For this reason the Appellants appeal must fail. 
Secondly, the Appellants contend that the statute of 
limitations does not bar their action. There is no Utah 
authority directly on point. However, the policy which should 
be applied in determining this issue can be found in the Utah 
Products Liability Act. If the legislative policy announced 
in that act is applied in this instance, the Appellants' cause 
of action must fail. 
The Respondent Clark respectfully submits that the 
judgment and orders of the lower court be sustained. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Clark Equipment Company 
Mailed two copies each 
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C. R. Henriksen, Esq. 
Joel H. Dembinsky, Esq. 
320 South Fifth East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
John H. Allen, Esq. 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84113 
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